By Emerson Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook
Strategy and Politics: An creation to online game conception is designed to introduce scholars with out history in formal thought to the applying of online game concept to modeling political tactics. This obtainable textual content covers the basic facets of video game conception whereas holding the reader continuously involved with why political technological know-how as a complete would get advantages from contemplating this technique. studying the very phenomena that strength political machineries―elections, legislative and committee methods, and overseas clash, the e-book makes an attempt to respond to basic questions on their nature and serve as in a transparent, available demeanour.
Included on the finish of every bankruptcy is a suite of routines designed to permit scholars to perform the development and research of political types. even though the textual content assumes purely an elementary-level education in algebra, scholars who entire a direction round this article will be outfitted to learn the majority of the pro literature that uses video game theoretic analysis.
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Extra info for Strategy and Politics: An Introduction to Game Theory
For example, then, in Fuse village (currently Chiba prefecture) in 1696, three bales of rice stored for tribute were stolen. After 10 days of searching, the thief could not be identified with any certainty. The village chief, section leaders, and 131 peasants thus agreed to hold an election to identify the thief. As a consequence, the two highest vote-getters were banished from the village and three others who received one or two votes each were sentenced to house arrest. In predicting the actions of a potential criminal in the usual case, a decision theoretic analysis would most likely suffice.
If their endorsement carries some weight and impacts the election’s competitiveness, then presumably it will impact the calculations of others who might attempt to influence the election’s outcome. Some of that influence might benefit the candidate in question if it leads other groups to endorse the same candidate. But it might also work against that group’s interests if it results in any increase in the endorsements received by other candidates. Thus, your decision as a solitary voter, made under the assumption of a “fixed electorate” as reflected in the polls, is decision theoretic because your decision hardly affects anyone.
In making this decision, then, a voter might, after perhaps talking things over with family and friends, consult the polls to determine whether his or her preferred candidate is competitive. But now suppose our voter is not an ordinary citizen but heads some highly visible interest group—a labor union or citizen action committee—and that he or she must decide who that group should endorse. The endorsement decision is similar to that of an ordinary voter in that the relative competitiveness of the candidates should be taken into consideration, but it is different in that any decision should also take into account the likelihood that the endorsement will not only influence more than a mere handful of voters but also perhaps the actions of other interest groups.
Strategy and Politics: An Introduction to Game Theory by Emerson Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook